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ULYSSES AND THE FATE OF FROZEN 
EMBRYOS — REPRODUCTION, 
RESEARCH, OR DESTRUCTION?
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
N his 10-year voyage back to Ithaca from
the Trojan War, Ulysses was warned by Circe
to take precautions if he wanted to hear the
Sirens’ transfixing song, or there would be “no sail-
ing home for him, no wife rising to meet him, /no
happy children beaming up at their father’s face.”1
Ulysses accordingly ordered his men to stop their ears
with beeswax and bind him firmly to the mast and
instructed them that if he gestured to be set free,
they should stick to the original agreement and bind
him tighter still. Making an agreement that has as a
major condition relinquishing the right to change
one’s mind can be called a “Ulysses contract.” In Ho-
meric mythology, such a contract can seem reason-
able; but should contemporary courts enforce such
a contract when a substantial change in family cir-
cumstances leads to a change of mind?
One application of the Ulysses-type agreement in-
volves the use of frozen embryos when a person who
has provided sperm or egg changes his or her mind
about a prior agreement. This issue has been the sub-
ject of three state-supreme-court opinions and rec-
ommended guidelines from various public and private
bodies. Although controversy is certain to continue,
the most recent state supreme court case, in Massa-
chusetts,2 and the most recent recommendations,
from the National Institutes of Health (NIH),3 are
likely to set practice standards in this arena for the
foreseeable future.
USING STORED EMBRYOS 
FOR REPRODUCTION
The case before the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court involved a dispute in a divorce over the
disposition of frozen embryos that had been created
by in vitro fertilization.2 The wife wanted to use the
embryos to attempt to have a child; the husband ob-
jected to this use. The couple had married in 1977.
They encountered difficulties in conceiving a child and
sought treatment for infertility. An ectopic pregnan-
cy ensued, ending with a miscarriage and the wife’s
loss of a fallopian tube. In 1988, they attempted gam-
ete intrafallopian transfer, which resulted in another
ectopic pregnancy and the removal of the wife’s re-
maining fallopian tube. Thereafter, they attempted
in vitro fertilization from 1988 through 1991, cul-
minating in 1992 with the birth of twin girls. Dur-
O
ing this period, two vials of embryos were frozen for
possible future use.
In 1995, the couple separated, and the wife sought
to use the frozen embryos to have additional children.
One of the vials was thawed and an embryo implant-
ed without notification of the husband, who discov-
ered the attempt only when his insurance company
informed him of it. Thereafter, the relationship de-
teriorated further, until the husband filed for divorce.
At the time of the divorce, one vial containing four hu-
man embryos remained in storage. The husband asked
the probate court for a permanent injunction to pre-
vent his wife from using the remaining embryos.2
The probate court examined the information about
the in vitro fertilization process that the couple un-
derwent, as well as the forms they signed. The court
found that both husband and wife had signed a form
entitled “Consent Form for Freezing (Cryopreserva-
tion) of Embryos” each time cryopreservation was
used. The form listed various contingencies, such as
death or separation, and asked the couple to deter-
mine what should be done with the remaining frozen
embryos under any of these circumstances. Except
for the first time, the husband always signed a blank
form that the wife later filled in and also signed. She
always specified that in the event of separation that
they “both agree[d] to have the embryo(s) . . . re-
turn[ed] to [the] wife for implant.”2
The probate court concluded that the agreement
was unenforceable because of the “change in circum-
stances” that had occurred in the four years since the
form was signed. These changes included the birth of
the twins, the wife’s obtaining a restraining order
against the husband, the husband’s filing for divorce,
and the wife’s attempt to use the embryos to have
additional children. In the words of the probate court,
“No agreement should be enforced in equity when
intervening events have changed the circumstances
such that the agreement which was originally signed
did not contemplate the actual situation now facing
the parties.”2 In the absence of an enforceable agree-
ment, the probate judge determined that the best
solution was to balance the wife’s interest in procre-
ation against the husband’s interest in avoiding pro-
creation; the court determined that the husband’s in-
terests outweighed the wife’s. The wife appealed. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court took the case
directly, agreed that the contract should not be en-
forced, and thus affirmed the decision.2
The core of the opinion is the Supreme Judicial
Court’s belief that courts should not enforce “agree-
ments to enter into familial relationships (marriage
or parenthood),” even if (unlike this contract) the
contract is unambiguous and is signed with full knowl-
edge by both parties.2 “As a matter of public policy,
we conclude that forced procreation is not an area
amenable to judicial enforcement,” and courts “will
not enforce contracts that violate public policy.”2
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The violation of public policy involves enforcing cer-
tain types of agreements that bind persons “to enter
or not to enter into familial relationships.” For ex-
ample, courts will not enforce agreements to marry,
and Massachusetts law prohibits a mother from agree-
ing to surrender her child for adoption until the
fourth day after birth. Quoting from a prior opinion,
in which the court refused to require a woman to
continue her pregnancy at her husband’s insistence,4
the court continued, “We would not order either a
husband or a wife to do what is necessary to conceive
a child or to prevent conception, any more than we
would order either party to do what is necessary to
make the other happy.”2
DESTRUCTION OR RESEARCH USE 
OF EMBRYOS
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court de-
scribed, but did not analyze, the two prior state-
supreme-court opinions on this question, from Ten-
nessee in 1992 and New York in 1998. The Tennessee
case involved a dispute between Junior and Mary Sue
Davis, who had used in vitro fertilization when they
were married and who disagreed at the time of their
divorce about what to do with stored embryos.5
Mary Sue wanted to use them to have a child, where-
as Junior wanted them destroyed. After years of liti-
gation, Mary Sue Davis changed her mind. Both par-
ties remarried, and she no longer wanted to use the
embryos herself, but she wanted to donate them to
another couple to use. There was no prior agreement,
but the Tennessee Supreme Court, in dicta (nonbind-
ing language), said that if there had been, it should
be enforced.5
Although the Tennessee opinion seems to be a
victory for a binding contract, it is not, because the
court admitted that it would not be likely to force
the transfer of the embryos to the wife, no matter
what prior agreement had been made, and that “or-
dinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should
prevail.”5 It is worth noting that the wife’s remar-
riage led her to change her mind about having the
embryos implanted in order to bear more children,
and that nowhere did the court suggest either that
remarriage was improper (as a breach of her first mar-
riage contract) or that Mary Sue should not be able
to use this change in her circumstances as a justifi-
cation to change her mind about the disposition of the
embryos from her first marriage.
Moreover, in a later ruling in this case, the court
noted that donation for research is another alterna-
tive, but that this would require the consent of both
parties. The court continued, “If they cannot agree
on this alternative, [the] only other choice [of Dr.
King, the physician with custody of the embryos] is
to discard the pre-embryos in question.”6 (The em-
bryos were ultimately destroyed.) The bottom line in
the Tennessee case, its pro-contract language notwith-
standing, is that the court refused to require the hus-
band to become a parent against his will and required
the contemporaneous consent of both parties to use
the embryos for either procreation or research. Thus,
the decision in the Massachusetts case can be seen
as consistent with the holding in the Tennessee case.
I have discussed the New York case at length in
an earlier article.7 It involved a divorce-related dis-
pute between Steven and Maureen Kass about what
should be done with their leftover embryos. The cou-
ple had previously undergone five egg-retrieval pro-
cedures and nine embryo transfers to the wife, and
one embryo transfer to the wife’s sister. Maureen Kass
sought sole custody of the remaining embryos, which
she wished to use in another in vitro fertilization
procedure. The couple had signed a form stating that
when they no longer wished to use the embryos to
initiate a pregnancy, the embryos were to be used “for
approved research.” In a three-to-two decision, the
New York Court of Appeals ruled that prior contracts
regarding the disposition of frozen embryos should
be considered valid and that a prior agreement to have
leftover embryos used for research should be en-
forced.8 The embryos were subsequently destroyed.
In my view, the New York court was wrong. Research
always requires informed consent, and research sub-
jects retain the right to change their minds and with-
draw from a study.7,9 On the other hand, since the
court did not find in favor of involuntary parent-
hood, the outcome of the New York case is consis-
tent with the Massachusetts decision.
USE OF STORED EMBRYOS FOR RESEARCH
The creation of human embryos for research pur-
poses has always been a contentious matter.10,11 Cur-
rent U.S. law, for example, explicitly prohibits federal
funding for the creation of human embryos for re-
search purposes or for any research in which a human
embryo is destroyed or discarded.12 With Caplan and
Elias, I have previously suggested that limiting fed-
erally funded research involving embryos to that us-
ing stored spare or surplus embryos from in vitro
fertilization clinics is a reasonable political compro-
mise.10 The ethical basis for this compromise is that
such embryos were created for the legitimate purpose
of procreation. When this goal is no longer sought
by the donors of the gametes, destruction, donation,
and research are the only alternatives. The donation
of spare embryos for important medical research that
cannot be conducted by other means is ethically su-
perior to either destroying them or keeping them
perpetually cryopreserved.10
The NIH has decided not to ask Congress to re-
scind its ban on embryo research but, instead, to op-
erate within the current rules. It has concluded that,
under existing legislation, it can fund research on
stem cells derived from the destruction of embryos
in privately funded clinics.13,14 Although the Nation-
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al Bioethics Advisory Commission has rightly con-
cluded that “there is no compelling ethical justifica-
tion for distinguishing between the derivation and use
of human stem cells,”14 the NIH’s position makes
political sense because Congress is likely to defer to
it, since Congress had previously come close to this
compromise and since there is a large new public
constituency in favor of stem-cell research. Nonethe-
less, the NIH has apparently decided to defer final
action on these guidelines until after the presidential
election.
The NIH’s position does, however, require that it
develop rules for research under which stem cells can
be derived from human embryos in an ethical man-
ner — and thus for research on human embryos in
general. The NIH’s current draft of these guidelines
limits such research to that using stored spare or sur-
plus embryos created in in vitro fertilization clinics,
like those at issue in the Massachusetts, Tennessee,
and New York cases.3 The NIH guidelines, which re-
late solely to research, go beyond the decisions of
these courts, but they are closest to the Massachusetts
opinion in requiring the agreement of both gamete
donors before the embryos are used in research.
Specifically, the NIH draft guidelines require not
only that in vitro fertilization clinics have special rules
for obtaining consent for the use of surplus embryos
for research, but also that “there should be a clear
separation between the decision to create embryos
for infertility treatment and the decision to donate
early human embryos in excess of clinical need for
research purposes”; only frozen early human embryos
should be used, and couples should be approached
about donation only at the time of deciding the dis-
position of the excess embryos.3
The NIH guidelines thus prohibit enforcing ad-
vance contracts by implicitly requiring the contempo-
raneous consent of both gamete donors to use surplus
embryos for research. (Under the guidelines, howev-
er, the consent of the couple for research use, given
at the time the embryos are no longer needed for re-
production, could arguably remain in effect indefi-
nitely.) The guidelines also go further in requiring
that, as in research with fetal tissue, “to avoid possi-
ble conflicts of interest, the attending physician re-
sponsible for the fertility treatment and the researcher
or investigator deriving and/or proposing to utilize
human pluripotent stem cells should not [be] one
and the same person.”3
A working group of the American Association for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) arrived at sim-
ilar conclusions, noting that “consent of both gamete
donors should be obtained.”15 The NIH guidelines
and the AAAS recommendations are reasonable, but
they are not binding on the private sector. Unless
the private sector voluntarily adopts them, there will
be no regulatory uniformity in embryo research in
the United States.
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
We are not accustomed to thinking about engage-
ments, marriage, having children, raising children, giv-
ing children up for adoption, or volunteering for a
research project as fit subjects for binding contracts.16
On such personal matters we generally permit the
current wishes of the persons involved to govern
practice, and in this respect it makes sense to consider
the disposition of one’s frozen embryos “as an in-
alienable right — a right that cannot be relinquished
irrevocably until a disposition decision actually will
be carried out.”17 Nonetheless, in our market-driven
medical care system, we have lately become obsessed
with contracts, and commercial values have often over-
come common sense. But advocates of binding con-
tracts in the in vitro fertilization industry can prevail
only by taking contracts out of their human context
and by ignoring the complexity of human relations.
The decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, which has already been used as precedent in
New Jersey,18 and the recommendations of the NIH
run counter to this market trend and could signal a
return to a more human-centered ethic.
What should physicians who run in vitro fertilization
clinics do in the wake of these legal developments?
Such clinics should continue to counsel couples about
the possibility of having spare or leftover embryos.
I believe they should also inform couples that they
will be asked to make a decision about what to do with
such embryos at the time when they are no longer
wanted for purposes of reproduction and that the two
members of the couple will have to agree on the dis-
position of their embryos. Only at the point at which
they actually decide they no longer want the embryos
stored (either because they have had all the children
they want or because they have abandoned attempts
at in vitro fertilization) should they be asked to de-
cide about the disposition of the embryos. Because of
unpredictable changes in family circumstances, deci-
sions made before this time are too hypothetical to
be considered either informed or voluntary and so
should be given little weight. Likewise, a decision to
donate embryos for research cannot be an informed
one if the man and woman do not know what the
purpose of the proposed research is. Even if a specific
area of research, such as stem-cell research, is agreed
to, each member of the couple retains the right to
withdraw the embryos from use in research before
the research is done. If the members of the couple
do not agree, the embryos should be destroyed.
Decisions regarding the disposition of embryos that
are made at the time the embryos are created are
much more like waivers of informed consent than in-
formed consent, and they more closely resemble pre-
sumed consent and “opt-out” procedures than in-
formed consent. No financial inducements should be
offered to the couple for the use of their embryos.
The person requesting authorization for the use of
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the embryos in research should have no financial or
professional stake in the research itself. In the ab-
sence of a contemporaneous agreement, the embryos
should be destroyed after reasonable attempts have
been made by the clinic to contact the couple for in-
structions. The burden of contact should be on the
clinic, since the clinic is in the business of embryo
storage. Putting the burden on the couple treats the
in vitro fertilization facility more like a pawnshop and
the embryos like a pawned watch.
If these basic procedures had been followed, of
course, the problems experienced in the Tennessee,
New York, and Massachusetts cases would have been
averted. These procedures are in accord with the
NIH guidelines as well. But how would they work
in the real world? The practice of having couples sign
contracts for the disposition of their embryos when
they begin treatment at an in vitro fertilization clinic
developed because so many cryopreserved embryos
are ultimately abandoned. A report from Britain il-
lustrates the problem.
The Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of
1990 permits embryos to be cryopreserved for a
maximum of five years. This law has been amended
to permit storage for up to 10 years with the written
consent of both persons who provided gametes. A
study by Oghoetuoma et al., which involved two in
vitro fertilization facilities in Britain, found that 1344
embryos from 359 couples remained in storage after
five years.19 By the end of 1998, nearly 50 percent
of these couples had not responded to two certified
letters regarding the disposition of their embryos.
Of the 182 couples who did respond, only 70 (38
percent) chose to extend the storage time; 32 per-
cent of the couples agreed either to donation of the
embryos to another infertile couple or to their use
in research (this number was not broken down in
the report on the findings), and 29 percent ordered
their embryos destroyed.
If these numbers are indicative of what can be ex-
pected in the United States, a minority of the em-
bryos that are no longer needed for procreation might
be made available for research. Utilitarians would
probably consider this low rate of use a waste of em-
bryos. But human embryos are not waste products,
and if we really mean to respect the human embryo
because of what it is or because of what it represents,
we must at least ensure that the people who created
it for purposes of procreation decide its fate together
at a time when the decision is likely to matter. The
number of embryos donated for research could also
be higher in the United States, because in vitro fer-
tilization clinics could do a much better job of keep-
ing in contact with their patients and might be mo-
tivated to do so now that they can no longer rely on
courts to enforce their Ulysses-like contracts.
Ulysses had an admirable spirit of adventure; but
in placing adventure above his family obligations, he
is not to be admired. We encounter Ulysses in Dante’s
Inferno, in the eighth circle of hell where Dante has
Ulysses explain that his love of adventure overwhelmed
his duty to his family:
Not fondness for my son, nor any claim
Of reverence for my father, nor love I owed
Penelope, to please her, could overcome
My longing for experience of the world.20
The cover story for enforceable advance contracts
in the in vitro fertilization industry has been that
they are necessary to support the “family-building”
business. The truth is that these contracts support
the market-driven in vitro fertilization clinics and
make their business easier to run. But contracts that
do not allow a change of mind undermine both ba-
sic principles of family law and good research ethics.
That is why they are no longer tenable.
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